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Summary
The author analyses the prerequisites and consequences of the implementa-
tion of different conflict management mechanisms, consociational and cen-
tripetal, in deeply divided societies, by looking at the “Komšić case” in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. The case concerns the election of the Croat member to 
the three-member Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Owing to the revi-
sion of electoral patterns laid down in the “Dayton Constitution” of 1995, pre-
requisites were created for the election of the Serb member of the Presidency 
by Serbs, the Bosniak member by Bosniaks, whereas only the Croat member 
could not be elected by Croats. Consequently, the Croat member of the Presi-
dency was elected by votes of Bosniaks in the 2006 and 2010 presidential 
elections. This led to a political and constitutional crisis in the country.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Conflict Management, Komšić Case, Lijp-
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1. Introduction
According to Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) 
comprises three constitutive peoples, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, as well as mem-
bers of the country’s national minorities and any nationally undeclared members 
of the population. Normatively speaking, the Croats are not a national minority. 
Empirically speaking, they are turning more and more into an ethnic minority and 
are being treated accordingly. This point of view is based on two major arguments. 
Firstly, non-majority ethnic groups are generally treated as minorities, regardless 
of their normative status: “Ethnic minorities are numeric minorities in a country” 
(Bochsler, 2011: 234). Accordingly, the Croats as well as the Serbs are minori-
ties, and the Bosniaks are “not a majority but a strong plurality” (Horowitz, 2008: 
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1237-1238). Secondly, the Croats had a subordinate position in the post-war state-
building. This was above all visible in the process of making the Dayton consti-
tution in which “the most important players were Bosnian Serbs of Republic of 
Srpska and the Bosniaks of the Federation (the Croats of the Federation played an 
increasingly secondary role)” (Petersen, 2011: 256). A thorough analysis of the con-
stitutional order shows that “the interests of the Croats are at some points protected 
more poorly than those of the Bosniaks and Serbs... The Croats are not excluded 
but they are in a worse position when compared to the Bosniaks and Serbs. This 
could be marked as a relative exclusion which intensifies HDZ efforts to keep the 
structures of their para-state of Herzeg-Bosnia” (Gromes, 2007: 374). Chronologi-
cally speaking, this political subordination traces its origins back to the process of 
concluding the Washington Agreement in 1994. It created the Federation of B-H 
as the first step of the state-reconstruction process which was marked by at least 
four special features. Firstly, the Federation was created during the war, more than 
a year before the Dayton Peace Accord was concluded. Secondly, it meant only a 
partial reconstruction of the state which included only two out of three constitutive 
peoples. Thirdly, it predetermined the constitutional order of the country by having 
established an entity or regional consociation, regardless of the constitutional order 
of the other part of the country which joined this “quasi-state” as The Republic of 
Srpska (RS) only after the Dayton Peace Accord was concluded. Fourthly, this solu-
tion was foisted upon the Bosniaks and the Croats by actors of international politics, 
above all by the USA. Enormously strong diplomatic pressure was placed on Cro-
atia to discipline leaders of the Croat community in B-H and to force them to accept 
the Federation (Reuter, 1997: 159; Chandler, 2000: 43; Bose, 2002: 75). Thanks to 
the consociational political arrangements established by the Washington and Day-
ton Peace Accords, the Croats, as the smallest constitutive people and a factual em-
pirical minority, should be represented equally or even over-represented in political 
institutions and in this way be equal to the other two peoples. But is it really so? 
There is a pretty broad consensus among the members of the Croat political and 
intellectual elite both in B-H and in Croatia that the Croat question has come to “a 
political dead end”. This point of view is supported by many politicians and intel-
lectuals outside the Croat elite who confirm the existence of “a crisis of the ‘Croat 
question’” which was in their opinion sparked off by the Social Democratic Party 
of B-H (SDP) with the so-called “Komšić case” (Džolan, 2013: 158, 249). “The 
Komšić case” did not spark the crisis of the “Croat question” in B-H, but it certainly 
raised it to one of its highest levels in the post-Dayton period, thereby making con-
stitutional problems of the whole country more visible. This case will hence be in 
the focus of consideration in this text. 
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2. Lijphart in Bosnia
There is a broad consensus on the fact that B-H is a deeply ethnically divided post-
conflict society which needs politics of accommodation as the main form of interac-
tion between the three co-constitutive ethnic communities, i.e. between their elec-
torally legitimised political elites. “Bosnia’s consociational constitution, embodied 
in the Dayton Accords of 1995” (Horowitz, 2008: 1221) is based on the politics of 
accommodation and “Dayton, clearly, is a consociational agreement” (Weller & 
Wolff, 2006: 4). There is no doubt that B-H was originally constituted as a conso-
ciational democracy despite different viewpoints on the patterns of consociational 
democracy. Belloni sees post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina as “a classical ex-
ample of consociational settlement” (Belloni, 2004: 336), O’Leary sees “corpo-
rate consociationalism”, as well as “complex consociationalism” (O’Leary, 2005: 
33-36), whereas Bogaards identifies “a fully fledged system of consociational de-
mocracy under international tutelage” (Bogaards, 2006: 123). Petersen sees it as 
“a bifurcated consociational political system” (Petersen, 2011: 243), Taylor as “a 
consociational democracy of new wave” (Taylor, 2009: 6), and Gromes as a typi-
cal “Konkordanzdemokratie” (Gromes, 2007: 243).1 The Washington and Dayton 
Peace Accords institutionalised consociational democracy at the national level in 
B-H, regulating relations between the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Croats (national 
consociation), and at the level of the Federation of B-H, regulating relations be-
tween the Bosniaks and the Croats (regional or entity consociation). The nation-
al consociation politically organises a three-segmental society in which none of 
the segments has an absolute majority, whereas the regional consociation organises 
a two-segmental society in which the Bosniak segment is absolutely numerically 
superior over the Croat. According to Lijphart’s interpretation, the two-segmental 
structure of a divided society is extremely unfavourable for the success of a con-
sociational democracy since one of the important prerequisites to its success is the 
non-existence of a majority segment that can behave imperialistically towards the 
smaller segment. This insight becomes extremely evident in the “Komšić case”.
The consociational order at the state level comprises: (a) the asymmetric terri-
torial autonomy of the two entities whereby the RS is a unitary entity and the Fede-
ration of B-H is an entity composed of ten units; (b) proportional and parity repre-
sentation of the three ethnic segments in the central legislative body; (c) executive 
power is composed according to the principle of entity proportionality; (d) all impor-
tant decisions in the parliament are made by consensus and by qualified or special 
majorities; (e) the Presidency, as a collective head of state, is formed by the princi-
1 For classical consociationalism s. Lijphart (2008). For corporate and liberal consociational-
ism s. O’Leary (2005).
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ple of ethnic parity; (f) the power of veto as a means of protection of vital national 
interests. The consociational order at the level of the Federation of B-H comprises: 
(a) cantons as federal units; (b) proportional and parity representation of the two 
ethnic segments in the legislative and the executive branches of government; (c) the 
power of veto which entitles the Bosniak and the Croat parliamentary groups to pro-
tect vital national interests in the House of Peoples of the federal parliament. 
A form of corporate consociationalism was initially visible at both levels. It 
was established and maintained with difficulties because the consensus on con-
stitutional arrangements and the political system among the members of the three 
constitutive ethnic communities and their political representatives has never been 
established (Hayden, 2005). In the case of B-H it means that not even the consensus 
on the state community itself has been reached since the Serb and the Croat com-
munities explicitly connect their minimal consent to the state to its consociational 
order, whereas the Bosniak community considers this order “subversive” for the 
survival of the state. The Bosniak community’s political representatives were look-
ing for, and sometimes even finding, political partners in the form of actors of inter-
national politics, above all in high representative positions in the international com-
munity in B-H, as well as in the US diplomacy and politics, who would help them 
to first “liberalise” and after that abolish this corporate consociationalism. And thus 
Horowitz was slowly “coming” to B-H. 
3. Horowitz in Bosnia
Elements of Horowitz’s “theory of political incentives”, the “centripetal approach” 
or “integrative majoritarianism” started to be incorporated into the political system 
and used in political practice soon after the conclusion of the peace agreement.2 
This was an expression of a principled disinclination of American constitutional de-
signers towards consociationalism. It was acceptable only as a temporary post-war 
solution, which practically confirmed that the Dayton Accord was conceived as a 
“transformative conflict settlement”: the “gradual evolution of the institutional sys-
tem, rather than large-scale changes, emphasises the transformative effects of the 
institutional arrangements agreed at Dayton” (Weller & Wolff, 2006: 4). Founders 
and distinguished advocates of the centripetal approach were involved in re-design-
ing the political system of B-H. Horowitz confirmed in a personal conversation with 
Austrian political scientist Florian Bieber that he was consulted in drawing up the 
permanent electoral law of B-H, but only a few of his suggestions were incorporat-
ed into law (Bieber, 2008: 169). Bosnian political scientist Suad Arnautović asserts 
2 For classical centripetalist school s. Horowitz (1993; 2000; 2003; 2008). For a cynical view 
about the “school” s. Bogaards (2015).
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that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) adopted the 
new electoral system, applied in 2000, “almost in full with certain modifications”, 
which was presented at the international conference in Sarajevo in 1998 by a group 
of experts in which the highest authority for the electoral and constitutional design 
in divided societies was vested in Benjamin Reilly, a consistent advocate of Horo-
witz’s approach (Arnautović, 2009: 599).
The consequences of the “arrival” of Horowitz in B-H were visible in several 
forms. Firstly, the alternative vote system, favoured by the centripetalist school, was 
used in the direct presidential elections in the RS in 2000, in order to create insti-
tutional prerequisites for the promotion of multi-ethnic parties, inter-ethnic accom-
modation, moderate politics and the election of a more moderate candidate based 
on the total of the first and second preferences. Milorad Dodik, current president of 
the RS, was in those days considered a moderate candidate in the eyes of the inter-
national community. Institutional designers presumed that Dodik could count on all 
the first preferences of the small number of Bosniaks and Croats living in the RS, 
as well as on the second preference of the Serbs and win by the total of the first and 
second preferences. The attempt failed. A candidate of the Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS) won the election and all the following presidents of the RS were elected by 
the majority system. Interestingly, Reilly announced the introduction of the same 
electoral system “for the tripartite presidency in deeply divided Balkan state of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina” (Reilly, 2001: 130). He pointed out that “AV has also been 
recommended – but not, at the time of writing, implemented – as an electoral reform 
in Europe’s most deeply divided state, Bosnia and Herzegovina” (ibid.: 143). And 
indeed, actors of international politics and experts prepared this model for the 2000 
elections, but it did not gain the support of the Croat and Serb sides and was never 
applied. Secondly, the way the members of the House of Peoples are elected was al-
so changed. The intra-ethnic voting was substituted by inter-ethnic voting, meaning 
that “everybody voted for everybody”. It practically meant that Bosniak cantonal 
legislators, who make up the majority of members of the ten cantonal assemblies, 
would crucially influence the election of Croat members of the House. The Croat 
Democratic Union (HDZ) as a leading Croat political party, which won the elec-
tions by an absolute majority in the Croat majority cantons, declared this procedure 
unconstitutional and temporarily withdrew from all federal political institutions. 
Thirdly, the way of electing the Bosniak member and the Croat member of 
the Presidency in the Federation was changed. Instead of the two corporate ethnic 
electoral bodies voting for their representatives, all voters were entitled to vote for 
all candidates. Regarding the numerical ratio between the Bosniaks and the Croats, 
it created an institutional framework within which the Bosniaks could elect both 
members of the Presidency in the Federation, which actually happened in the 2006 
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and 2010 elections. Fourthly, almost a pure PR for the first chamber of the Par-
liamentary Assembly was substituted by a compensatory PR in the multimember 
constituencies, which makes the parliamentarisation of smaller non-ethnic or multi-
ethnic parties easier. Thanks to the compensatory mandates, the parties which were 
not able to win seats in basic constituencies entered the parliament. The election of 
the Croat member of the B-H Presidency in 2010 will be more thoroughly analysed 
further on in the paper as an example of the consequences of the application of the 
limited centripetal strategy. 
4. Elections of the Croat Members of the B-H Presidency 
The B-H Presidency is a collective head of state whose members are elected in di-
rect elections. The number of members, the way they are elected, as well as the pat-
terns of representation have changed from the first (1990) elections. Seven mem-
bers were elected in the pre-war elections in 1990 – two Croats, two Muslims (as of 
1993: Bosniaks), two Serbs and one representative of the “Others” – in the whole 
territory of B-H. A common electoral list with the names of all candidates was 
formed. Each voter had one vote by which he could vote for a candidate of his/her 
ethnic group. The winners were the candidates who won the majority of votes with-
in their ethnic groups and within the “Others”. Related to the size of the ethnic com-
munities and their electorates, two elected representatives of the Muslims took first 
and second place, two representatives of the Serbs took fourth and sixth place, two 
Croats eighth and ninth, whereas one representative of the others ended up third ac-
cording to the number of gained votes. All of the elected representatives of the three 
constitutive ethnic communities were candidates of the strongest ethnic parties – of 
the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the SDS and the HDZ – and even 
the representative of the “Others” belonged to the SDA, who at the time of the elec-
tion formally declared himself a Yugoslav, but soon declared himself a Muslim. The 
changes of the composition of the Presidency which were occurring during the war 
undermined its democratic legitimacy and caused the institution to be declared il-
legitimate above all in the Serb, but also in the Croat political community. As soon 
as the first conflicts broke out, the elected Serb representatives left the Presidency. 
The remaining members of the Presidency co-opted representatives of Serbs with-
out electoral legitimacy into this body by an arbitrary decision. The same scenario 
happened with the Croat representatives (Komšić, 2006). 
The Dayton constitution changed the composition of the Presidency and the 
way its members are elected. It has become a three-member body comprised of 
one representative of the Bosniaks, one of the Croats and one of the Serbs who are 
elected on separate ethnic lists. The three constitutive communities form ethnic 
corporate electoral bodies within which each voter has only one vote, which he/she 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 174-190
180
gives to one of the candidates from his/her ethnic list. Members of the Presidency 
were elected in this way in the first post-war elections in 1996 as well as in the 1998 
and 2002 elections. Candidates of the strongest ethnic parties (SDA, HDZ and SDS) 
overwhelmingly won in all three cycles, with the exception of 1998 when a candi-
date of the “Sloga”, a coalition of three Serb parties, became the Serb representa-
tive. Since the focus of this study is on the election of Croat members of the B-H 
Presidency, it is worth mentioning that HDZ candidates won by a large margin in all 
the three cycles of presidential elections: Krešimir Zubak won 88.7% (1996), Ante 
Jelavić 52.9% (1998) and Dragan Čović 61.5% of the votes cast (2002). Neverthe-
less, since the 2006 elections things have radically changed. The Social Democratic 
Party of B-H – formally the leading multi-ethnic party, but actually a predominantly 
Bosniak party – entered the race for the Croat member of the Presidency. The party 
put up its vice-president Željko Komšić as a Croat candidate. Komšić is ethnically 
of Croat origin, but he was publicly profiled as a “political Bosnian” who did not 
have much in common with the programmes and politics of the leading Croat par-
ties in B-H. Komšić’s candidacy becomes even more indicative if one is aware of 
the fact that in the 2006 presidential elections the SDP as a de facto Bosniak party 
did not put up its candidate for the Bosniak member of the Presidency. Komšić won 
116,062 votes or 40% of the votes cast, whereas the two candidates of the HDZ 
and the HDZ 1990 gained together 130,006 votes or 44.3% of the votes cast. Im-
mediately after the declaration of the election’s results, the Croat political parties 
asserted that Komšić had not been elected by the votes of the Croats and was hence 
not their legitimate representative in the Presidency. 
They provided two pieces of evidence in this matter. Firstly, more than a 
100,000 voters, more than in the previous elections, voted for the Croat member of 
the Presidency, which made them conclude that numerous members of other com-
munities, above all of the Bosniaks, gave their votes to the Croat member. Secondly, 
an analysis of territorial origin of votes they received showed that Komšić gained 
very few votes in the areas in which the Croats were in the majority and the most 
votes in those areas in which the Bosniaks formed a majority of the population. But 
a true political drama took place in the 2010 presidential elections. Komšić was 
again put up as a candidate for the Croat member of the Presidency by the SDP and 
his overwhelming victory over the HDZ candidate deepened and sharpened ten-
sions not only in the Federation, but also in the whole of B-H. In order to understand 
the nature of the “primary conflict” one should outline profiles of the two main par-
ties, the HDZ and the SDP, whose candidates competed in the race for the Croat 
member of the B-H Presidency. 
The HDZ is a purely ethnic party established in the Croat community in B-H, 
articulating the community’s interests, and is legitimated by the support of its mem-
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bers. It has evolved from a wartime separatist or semi-separatist organisation to a 
party which formally accepted B-H after the conclusion of the peace agreements, 
although neither the entire electorate nor the party leadership has ever given up 
its secessionist goals. According to one study from 1998, as much as 79% of the 
Croats did not support the survival of B-H, wanting Croat ethnic territories to join 
Croatia (Gromes, 2007: 209). In the same year, 84% of Croats were “opposed to a 
united Bosnian state” (Bose, 2002: 3). Political objectives have become particularly 
radicalised at the moment when the leadership of the RS sharpened its secession-
ist rhetoric, flirting with the possibility of a referendum on the secession of the RS 
from B-H, leaving the Croats with a perspective of life in a rump state in which the 
Bosniaks would make up an absolute majority of the population and they a national 
minority. The HDZ supported the idea of a third entity, i.e. of a reorganisation of 
B-H into a confederation of three ethnic states or at least into a federation of three 
or more ethnic units/territories. In October 2000 it tried – based on a referendum 
which was held among the Croats in B-H on the general election day in the coun-
try, in which 90% out of 77% of voters declared themselves for a Croat entity – to 
establish the Croat self-government as a third entity. In May 2007 the HDZ tried to 
re-establish the wartime Croat political community of Herzeg-Bosnia which was de-
clared unconstitutional and disbanded by actors of international politics. The HDZ 
vehemently rejected any idea of the establishment of a unitary, decentralised, or 
even a regionalised B-H without ethnic division lines. Shortly, it excluded all the 
options preferred by the SDP. Furthermore, the HDZ has been, since its beginnings, 
explicitly anti-Communist and the SDP has been its “natural” political opponent as a 
successor party of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SK BiH). 
The efforts of actors of international politics within and outside B-H were openly 
directed at weakening and destroying the HDZ. In the pre-war and all the post-war 
parliamentary and presidential elections in B-H and in the Federation, the HDZ has 
won an overwhelming majority of votes of the Croats. In the 2010 elections for the 
parliament of B-H the HDZ won 45.2% of the votes in municipalities with the Croat 
majority and its splinter party the HDZ 1990 another 22% of the votes cast. 
The SDP is a successor party of the Communist party which has never com-
pletely given up the ideological heritage and political tradition of Titoism as a Yugo-
slav version of Communism. It is reputed as the strongest multi-ethnic party, trying 
to attract voters from different ethnic groups, although it enjoys very little support 
outside the Bosniak community. In the 2010 elections for the parliament of B-H the 
SDP won 2.96% of the votes in the RS and 7.3% of the votes in the 23 federal mu-
nicipalities with the Croat majority. The SDP opposes the Dayton system and sup-
ports the abolition of entities and cantons. It sees B-H as a “decentralised state of 
regions” based on economic, geographical, transport and other criteria. In the whole 
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post-war period it was a particular favourite of the international community which 
helped the SDP in all possible ways to grow stronger and to win power (Chandler, 
2002: 112; Gromes, 2007: 231-232). A Croat politician as well as many intellectu-
als call the SDP “a Bosniak-centric party” and “a gravedigger of social democratic 
ideas” in B-H (Džolan, 2013: 21, 38). After the initial doubts, foreign analysts also 
concluded that it is “nominally a multi-ethnic, but considerably a Bosniak” party 
(Caspersen, 2004: 575; Bose, 2002: 8). The SDP could actually be subsumed under 
Horowitz’s category of an open ethnic party which includes members of other ethnic 
communities, but elections eventually show whose party it actually is. Ethnic parties 
with a multi-ethnic façade include members of different ethnic groups in their mem-
bership, choose them in their leadership and put them on their list of candidates. “If 
voters elect a minority member of such an ethnic party to a certain post, it cannot 
be treated as non-ethnic voting since what counts is the ethnic identification of the 
party and not that of a single candidate. On the other hand, it happens very rarely that 
members of the ethnic group to which the candidate of the façade multi-ethnic party 
nominally belongs, actually vote for him” (Horowitz, 2000: 320-321). 
Since it is impossible to determine exactly how individual members of ethnic 
communities voted, I use indirect evidence that creates “a closed circle of circum-
stantial evidence”. I use two types of evidence: voting results in towns and munici-
palities with an absolute Croat and an absolute Bosniak majority.
Table 1 shows that the SDP candidate did not win in any of the 23 munici-
palities with an absolute Croat majority. A bigger ethnic homogeneity, i.e. a big-
ger share of Croats in the electorate meant more votes for the HDZ candidates and 
fewer votes for the SDP candidate. Typical examples of ethnically most homogene-
ous Croat municipalities are in West Herzegovina. And vice versa: if a municipa-
lity is more heterogeneous, i.e. if the share of Croats in the electorate is smaller, the 
Croat candidates win less and the SDP candidate slightly more votes, as in some 
municipalities in Central and North Bosnia. These differences are not to be inter-
preted as a confirmation of the stereotypes about the political divisions between the 
Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats. The HDZ candidates won and the SDP candi-
date lost in all municipalities that have an absolute Croat majority. The differences 
in voting primarily arise from the differences in the share of Croats in the elector-
ate of these municipalities, and not from the political differences between the Her-
zegovinian and Bosnian Croats. Moreover, Caspersen found that ethnic voting in 
B-H was often more evident in more ethnically heterogeneous municipalities than 
in more ethnically homogeneous municipalities (2004: 577-578). The election re-
sults in Mostar confirm this general finding. Mostar is a physically and politically 
divided town: Croats make up an absolute majority in West Mostar and Bosniaks 
in East Mostar. The Croat candidate for a member of the Presidency in East Mostar 
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Table 1. Election for the Croat Member of the Presidency of B-H in 2010 
in the Municipalities with Croat Majority1






Total of valid 
votes: 152,997 Votes % Votes % Votes % Votes %
Čapljina 6,431 55.9 2,357 20.5 968 8.4 1,756 15.2
Čitluk 3,238 61.0 1,842 34.8 97 1.8 124 2.4
Dobretići 277 45.1 311 50.7 20 3.3 6 0.9
Domaljevac/Šamac3 991 60.9 425 26.1 132 8.1 78 4.9
Grude 3,162 56.7 1,304 23.4 128 2.3 987 17.6
Kiseljak 3,322 37.6 1,028 11.6 1,649 18.7 2.841 32.1
Kreševo 1,167 46.7 386 15.4 268 10.7 679 27.2
Kupres3 844 56.9 472 31.8 78 5.3 89 6.0
Livno 6,896 51.5 1,964 14.7 1,150 8.6 3,378 25.2
Ljubuški 5,002 51.7 3,352 34.6 210 2,2 1,116 11.5
Neum 756 54.2 532 38.2 62 4.4 44 3.2
Novi Travnik 2,463 23.7 1,141 11.0 2,425 23.3 4,377 42.0
Odžak3 1,816 27.4 1,177 17.8 1,745 26.3 1.885 28.5
Orašje3 4,149 51.9 1,983 24.8 918 11.5 944 11.8
Posušje 3,352 51.7 2,631 40.5 99 1.5 407 6.3
Prozor/Rama 1,853 29.6 2,544 40.6 559 8.9 1,314 20.9
Ravno3 237 34.0 428 61.3 10 1.4 23 3.3
Stolac3 2,960 43.9 1,010 15.0 988 14.7 1,782 26.4
Široki Brijeg 8,621 66.2 2,151 16.5 105 0.8 2,150 16.5
Tomislavgrad 3,546 47.2 2,651 35.3 518 6.9 801 10.6
Usora 404 23.8 747 44.1 263 15.5 280 16.6
Vitez 3,569 29.2 2,249 18.4 2,180 17.8 4,215 34.6
Žepče 3,847 33.7 1,263 11.1 1,842 16.1 4,466 39.1
Total 68,903 45.0 33,948 22.2 16,414 10.7 33,732 22.0
¹ Results of three candidates with most votes. 
² All other candidates.
³ Municipalities divided by Federation and RS after 1995.
Source: http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Opstine.aspx. Calculations 
by the author.
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did not only defeat his Croat counter-candidates, but he also obtained more votes 
than the candidate for the Bosniak member of the Presidency. The HDZ candidate 
overwhelmingly won in West Mostar leaving her SDP opponent with only 12.9% 
of the votes cast. 
Furthermore, the SDP candidate for the Croat member of the Presidency won 
in 35 out of 45 municipalities with the Bosniak majority, obtaining more votes than 
all the Bosniak candidates. Komšić gained on average 36.1% of the votes in these 
45 municipalities, whereas the best positioned Bosniak candidate Bakir Izetbegović 
(SDA) obtained only 21.3% of the votes and won only in seven municipalities. 
The municipality of Kalesija is often quoted as an oddity. There were altogether 35 
Croats in the electoral register. The HDZ and HDZ 1990 candidates won 33 votes, 
whereas Komšić won 7,033 votes, more than the two leading Bosniak candidates 
combined (Vukoja, 2011: 87). Komšić won 41.2% of the votes in the four biggest 
Bosnian cities in which the Bosniaks make up an absolute majority – Sarajevo, Ze-
nica, Tuzla and Bihać – a little bit less than the three first-placed Bosniak candidates 
Table 2. Election for the Croat and Bosniak Members of the Presidency of B-H in 
2010 in Mostar
Candidate
East Mostar1 West Mostar1 Mostar1
Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Borjana Krišto (HDZ) 476 2.5 11,848 45.7 12,367 25.9
Željko Komšić (SDP) 6,778 35.8 3,342 12.9 10,627 22.2
Martin Raguž (HDZ 1990/HSP) 274 1.4 6,861 26.5 7,170 15.0
Bakir Izetbegović (SDA) 4,825 25.5 569 2.2 5,497 11.5
Fahrudin Radončić (SBB) 3,109 16.4 634 2.4 3,843 8.0
Haris Silajdžić (SBiH) 2,513 13.3 431 1.7 3,011 6.3
Others 964 5.1 2,220 8.6 5,273 11.0
Total 18,939 100.0 25,905 100.0 47,788 100.0
¹ East Mostar: constituencies 1, 2, 3 with absolute majority of Bosniaks; West Mostar: constitu-
encies 4, 5, 6 with absolute majority of Croats; Mostar: constituencies 1-6 and city district Mo-
star with very small electorate.
Source: Central Electoral Commission of B-H. http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/Pred-
sjednistvoBiH/Opstine.aspx. Calculations by the author.
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who won together 44.5% of the votes. Finally, it is visible from the aggregated data 
in table 3 that Komšić was the third-placed candidate for the Croat member of the 
Presidency of B-H in places with a Croat majority, and in most cases the first-placed 
candidate for the same post in places with a Bosniak majority.
When the election results were made public, the institution of the Presidency 
was pushed into the centre of the political crisis. Members of the three ethnicities 
and their political representatives reacted very differently to the results of the presi-
dential elections. For the Croats, the way of electing the Croat member was the key 
evidence of their exposure to majoritarianism and inequality both in the Federation 
and in B-H. Conflicts in the formation of the legislative and the executive powers in 
the state and in the Federation after elections, in which the HDZ occasionally used 
the method of obstruction and blockade, were to a large degree a reflection of the 
presidential elections. The rhetoric of the leading Croat parties in B-H was radical-
ised, the distrust of most Croats in the future of the Federation and the whole state 
was deepened, and the option according to which “for many Croats, the solution is 
to exit” (Petersen, 2011: 245) was intensified. The Bosniaks did not only elect the 
two members of the Presidency, but they also got two representatives in this body 
in regard to the political conviction of Komšić and of the SDP. On the other hand, 
the Croats neither elected nor had their member in that body. For the Serbs, who 
were not directly impacted by the elections, this was evidence of the unitaristic 
Table 3. Election for the Croat Member of the Presidency of B-H in 2010 in the 
Municipalities and Cities with Croat and Bosniak Majority (only three candidates 
with most votes)
Candidate
Municipalities and cities 
with Croat majority1
Municipalities and cities 
with Bosniak majority2 Total
Votes % Votes % Votes %
178,902 17.8 824,435 82.2 1,003,337 100.0
Željko Komšić 
(SDP) 19,756 11.0 311,832 37.8 331,588 33.0
Borjana Krišto 
(HDZ) 80,751 45.1 23,927 2.9 104,678 10.4
Martin Raguž 
(HDZ 1990) 40,809 22.8 16,577 2.0 57,386 5.7
¹ Aggregated data of 23 municipalities with the Croat majority and West Mostar.
² Aggregated data of 45 municipalities, 4 cities with the Bosniak majority and East Mostar. 
Source: Central Electoral Commission of B-H. http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/Pred-
sjednistvoBiH/Opstine.aspx. Calculations by the author.
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pretensions of the Bosniaks and an additional reason to engage in a strong defence 
of the Dayton status of the RS or to opt for a secession. While commenting on the 
“Komšić case”, Milorad Dodik, the most influential Serb politician in B-H, said: 
“We observe the thing that is going on right now in the Federation as a possible 
message to us about the way the Bosniaks are getting even with the Croats who are 
marginalized, outvoted and disrespected. They are sending a clear message to us: 
‘it is your turn as soon as we clean this up and get even with the Croats...’ But, of 
course, our turn will never come” (Dodik, 2011: 164). The position of the Croats in 
the Federation was understood as an indicator of the potential status of Serbs if the 
RS was to be abolished (Rajčević, 2012: 164). The Bosniaks basically ignored this 
problem. They were ready to problematise the institution of the Presidency above 
all from the perspective of the case Sejdić & Finci vs. BiH, seeing in this a chance to 
undermine the Dayton constitution and to shake the foundations of “ethnocracy”.3 
Of course, not everybody estimated the “Komšić case” negatively. Political and the-
oretical supporters of the reconstruction of B-H into a pure liberal state exulted over 
everything that had happened, calling the “Komšić case” the most positive “subver-
sion” of the Dayton system since its establishment (Štiks, 2011).
5. Conclusion: What Next?
Lijphart’s classical consociational school excludes presidential and semi-presiden-
tial systems with a direct election of the state president from the institutional design 
of deeply divided societies and supports a pure parliamentary system and the elec-
tion of the state president in the parliament. This model is rejected by the political 
leadership of the RS as they consider it a form of disempowerment of the ethnic 
entities in favour of central state institutions. They have nothing against the idea 
that the Croat and the Bosniak members are elected in the central parliament, but 
insist on a direct election of the Serb member in the RS. This is in the first place 
not accepted by the Bosniak side because it is seen as an additional increase in 
the asymmetry between the two entities and a further disintegration of the state. 
Moreover, the three-member Presidency does not solve the problem of the ECHR 
verdict. The centripetalist school does not exclude non-parliamentary and parlia-
3 B-H was sued to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) by Jakob Finci, the president 
of the Jewish community, and Dervo Sejdić, the president of Roma organisation, for discriminat-
ing against members of national minorities through legal documents by guaranteeing them only 
the active, but not the passive right to vote in elections for Presidency of B-H and for House of 
Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly. On 22nd December 2009 the ECHR reached a verdict by 
majority of votes, saying that B-H breaches the European Convention of Human Rights which 
forbids any type of discrimination. It was concluded that the rules for the elections of these two 
institutions were discriminatory, and the ECHR ordered B-H to abolish these rules and practices. 
See http://www.wchr.coe.int
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mentary systems with a directly elected state president in divided societies. The 
famous “Nigerian case” is promoted as a prototypical pattern of electing the state 
president in which the winning candidate did not only have to obtain the “plural-
ity of votes cast in presidential elections, but also at least 25 percent of the votes 
cast in no fewer than two-thirds of states” (Horowitz, 2008: 1223). Besides the sys-
tems of preferential voting in parliamentary elections, its advocates also support 
the option of a “directly elected president chosen either by a national election on 
the basis of the alternative vote, or through a supermajority requirement where the 
winning candidate must win, not merely a natural majority, but surmount a thresh-
old in all regions of the country” (Reilly, 2001: 157). This means that a candidate 
who would represent the Croats in the Presidency should get a legally prescribed 
percentage of votes in federal units with a Croat majority. Swiss political scientist 
Daniel Bochsler’s patterns are close to the centripetalist school. He suggests that a 
five-member Presidency be elected by the system of a single non-transferable vote 
(SNTV): each voter would have one vote which he/she would give to one candi-
date. Candidates with the most votes would be elected. The fourth and the fifth 
seat would be open to inter-ethnic electoral competition. Bosniak and Croat parties 
would in this way be motivated to address voters outside of their groups in order 
to win these mandates. But voters of more numerous ethnic groups can vote for a 
candidate of a minority group, so there is no guarantee that the Croat member of 
the Presidency would not be elected by others. This would not happen only if the 
Croat ethnic bloc fanatically closed its ranks around one candidate and if the “qua-
si-proportional nature” of the SNTV actually started to function (Bochsler, 2011: 
75-76). Bochsler also considers the possibility to elect the members of the Presi-
dency in the whole country by the system of a single transferable vote (STV) and 
by the geometric mean. Candidates with the highest geometric mean of the votes 
of the majority and of the minority would be chosen according to the pattern GS 
= √ (gv x gm). This would enable the election of candidates who are popular both 
with the majority and with the minority, i.e. “who are supported by two different 
sovereigns” (ibid.: 77-78). The geometric mean rule could also be applied to the 
election of the three or five members of the Presidency, whereby each voter would 
have two or three votes. Nevertheless, the suggestion again overlooks the fact that 
the Federation is not an ethnically homogenous entity, which means that the geo-
metric mean rule would practically ensure victory for the candidate supported by 
the majority of the Serbs and Bosniaks in the two entities. Since B-H consists of 
entities of unequal size, it would be suitable to use the weighted geometric mean 
rule based on the cube root: GSw = ³√ (VFed² x VRS). This should prevent the situ-
ation where votes from the RS would have a greater influence on the election of a 
candidate than those from the Federation (ibid.: 79-80). Bochsler believes that the 
rules of the pure and modified geometric mean would encourage political parties 
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and candidates to fight for the votes from more ethnic groups, contributing in this 
way to the ethnic accommodation. 
Political and professional circles offer a wide range of different suggestions on 
this issue. Some think that B-H should have one president of the state who is elected 
in the whole state, providing that a member of one people cannot be the state presi-
dent in the following three mandates. This would create space for candidates from 
the other two constitutive peoples and “Others” to “have their turn”. This suggestion 
is supported by the Bosniaks who want to “normalise” B-H in this way, referring 
to the basically non-comparable practice of the neighbouring countries which elect 
their state presidents directly, but which are not deeply divided ethnic societies. The 
others stand for a direct election of all members of the Presidency. They see the Fe-
deration divided into two constituencies – one with a Croat and one with a Bosniak 
majority – while the RS would form one constituency. All eligible citizens would 
have both the active and the passive right to vote. This would formally meet the re-
quirements of the ECHR verdict, although it is clear that the ethnic structure of the 
constituencies predetermines the election of the three members from the three con-
stitutive peoples. This pattern was advocated by the Croat side, it was not opposed 
by the Serb elite, but it was rejected by Bosniak parties. The third view argues that 
the members of the Presidency – one president and two vice-presidents – should be 
elected in the Parliamentary Assembly of B-H. This solution was also advocated 
by the Venice Commission within the evaluation of the “April Package”, one of the 
many failed draft constitutional reforms from 2006. The solution suggests a more 
emphasised parliamentarianisation of the system by reducing authority of the indi-
rectly elected head of state. Candidates would be formally nominated, but actually 
elected, by parliamentary groups in the House of Peoples among the members of the 
Parliamentary Assembly. The provision saying that the president and the vice-presi-
dents must not belong to the same people is not interpreted as discriminatory toward 
the others since it is not specified which peoples are meant. The fourth advocate a 
US-like electoral college: the RS would be one electoral unit, whereas the electoral 
units in the Federation would be cantons or, alternatively, districts for parliamentary 
elections. The two candidates with the most victories in the cantons/electoral dis-
tricts would be elected in the Federation. If the candidates have an equal number of 
victories, the candidate with more votes would win the election. Is there a way out of 
this Rashomon-like view of solving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s problems?
The “Komšić case”, as well as political events before and after it, shows that 
B-H is, two decades after the Dayton Accord, still a deeply ethnically divided soci-
ety with strong collective ethnic identities which cannot be deconstructed by vio-
lence or pressure. Hence, both foreign and domestic re-designers of the corporate 
consociationalism of the Dayton provenance must face this fact. This seems a bet-
ter solution than to reopen violent conflicts, to divide the country by the secession 
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of one of its parts (RS) or to impose the control of one community over the other 
(in the Federation) which would lead to new conflicts or the dissolution of the state. 
There is an open discussion in the RS about two options in the case of secession 
from B-H: the first one implies unification with Serbia, and the second one the es-
tablishment of the RS as a sovereign state according to the Greek-Cypriot pattern 
(Rajčević, 2012: 72). The corporate consociationalism in B-H is based on competi-
tive elections. It enabled the creation of a multi-party system and it did not prevent 
the development of a political opposition within the three main ethnic communi-
ties, and thereby the development of a political opposition to the coalition govern-
ment both at the level of entities and at the state level. It also prevented the “war of 
camps”, giving each of them the opportunity to mind their own business in accord-
ance with the proverb “good fences make good neighbours”. “Liberal internation-
alists” should hence be more restrained in criticising consociational arrangements, 
which for now hold together a deeply divided country, and they should be even 
more thoughtful in their re-designing.
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